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Abstract: Citizens’ juries have become a popular method for engaging citizens in deliberation about
complex public policy issues, such as climate action and sustainable development. Empirical evidence
routinely indicates that jurors change their minds throughout the process. What is less clear is when
and why this occurs and whether the causes are consistent across juries that consider the same topic
but are situated within different contexts. We present evidence of opinion change in citizens’ juries
through a natural experiment, contrasting three local contexts of onshore windfarm development
in Scotland; viz. existing, planned, and absent. Jurors’ individual opinions of climate change, wind
energy, and windfarms were measured through questionnaires at four time points: the start, following
information-giving, reflection, and deliberation. Statistical examination of jurors’ responses, through
paired sample t-tests, Wilcoxon sign-tests, and Generalised Least Squares regression, reveals to what
extent substantive changes were associated with different phases and locational contexts. In all three
juries, opinion change occurs throughout the process, on different topics, and to different degrees.
While the information phase consistently influences jurors’ opinions the most, jury composition affects
the magnitude and direction of opinion change, with outcomes contingent on contexts. Our findings
are important for informing how mini-publics are designed and used to inform environmental
policy-making at different scales.
Keywords: political participation; citizens’ juries; deliberation; natural experiment; opinion change;
sustainability; windfarms; Scotland
1. Introduction
Citizen engagement is critical to enable the complex socio-economic transformations
required for a sustainable future [1]. Indeed, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development
presents a clear mandate for public participation, outlining a shared vision to “ensure
responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels” (Indi-
cator 16.7) [2]. Mini-publics are now widely used in policymaking practice as a means of
bringing citizens into processes of framing, advising on, or deciding about, complex public
policy issues such as climate action and environmental health from local to global gover-
nance [3], exemplified by the rise of climate assemblies [1]. A key aim of the mini-publics
is to realise norms of deliberative democracy [4] and to foster its long-term sustainabil-
ity, as argued in this special issue of the journal by Strandberg et al. [5], in relation to
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mixed deliberations between citizens and politicians, and by Kulha et al. [6], in relation to
environmental intergenerational fairness.
A central tenet of the normative theory of deliberative democracy is that participants
should enter a discussion with an open mind, be willing to reflect upon their opinions in
light of reasons offered by others, and therefore remain open to changing their opinions
accordingly. Only with open minds can the ‘forceless force of the better argument’ [7]
(p. 108) have any chance of prevailing. These mindsets alone realise the epistemic and
prudential benefits that justify a deliberative approach to democracy. However, it is evident
that, firstly, there are many causes of opinion change other than deliberation [8]. Secondly,
and more concerning from a deliberative democracy perspective, many of these causes are
not compatible with the norms of deliberative democracy, such as manipulation and bias.
We, therefore, need a greater understanding of the role deliberation plays in generating
opinion reflection and change, and the potential conditioning effects of the context in which
it occurs.
Much of the research to date on this issue has been conducted through mini-publics,
that is, participatory processes where citizens are selected through a civic lottery (e.g.,
stratified random sampling) and supported to engage in informed deliberation to produce
recommendations or decisions on a public issue. A key reason for their popularity is
that mini-publics are artificially designed to create environments conducive to learning,
open-mindedness and deliberation that stimulate opinion reflection. Indeed, empirical
evidence from mini-publics routinely indicates that participants do indeed reflect on,
revise and modify their opinions during the process [4]. However, the evidence from
these studies is far from conclusive with regard to the relationship between deliberation
and opinion reflection and change. In particular, it is not clear which aspect(s) of the
process is associated with opinion change and whether the findings are consistent across
mini-publics in different contexts. This is important for assessing the compatibility of
opinion change with the norms of deliberative democracy, mini-public design, and the
application and use of mini-publics. If mini-publics are to guide political choices amongst
the public and policymakers, as some have advocated [9], then we must understand what
shapes the opinions participants have at the end of the process and ascertain if this is
consistent within different contexts, or responsive to those contexts, so we can discuss the
level of trust and influence that should be afforded to these opinions and the deliberative
process. Environmental governance offers an excellent context to study these issues because
deliberation must encompass local, national, and global considerations.
This paper analyses three standardised citizens’ juries conducted in Scotland on the
contested topic of onshore windfarms. They were held contemporaneously in locations
with different levels of exposure to local windfarms. This was organised as a research
project rather than an official policy process, but it was nonetheless designed to inform
Scottish debate about onshore windfarms, deliberative public engagement, and democratic
innovations. Despite it being a research project, it aims to offer insights of relevance to
environmental governance, especially given the proliferation of mini-publics on this topic,
and the need to understand better the dynamics within these processes. Nonetheless, due
to the limitations of size and context, this study is only one of several that will be needed
to generate reliable and coherent theory for the purposes of policy.
The task for the jurors was to consider: ‘What should be the key principles for deciding
about windfarm development, and why?’ Accordingly, participants were invited to engage
with long-term considerations regarding policy, energy generation, and climate change,
topics that have been at the centre of Scotland’s debate on environmental governance
(Further details are provided on the project website: https://www.climatexchange.org.
uk/research/projects/citizens-juries-on-wind-farm-development-in-scotland/ (accessed
on 26 August 2021)). Here, we analyse if, how, and when jurors change their opinions
during the course of the process in three different locations, using findings from survey
research, supplemented by ethnographer and evaluator fieldnotes. Consequently, our
analysis contributes to testing the normative claims made by deliberative democrats about
Sustainability 2021, 13, 9852 3 of 21
opinion change, and, moreover, to debates about the contribution citizens’ juries can make
to institutionalising deliberative democracy in environmental governance, given various
contextual conditions. In our research, we were interested in testing whether opinions
about the key principles for wind farm development were consistent in conclusion for
Scotland as a whole, irrespective of location, or whether these contextual differences were
reflected in opinion divergence.
The paper is divided into five sections. The first two consider the theories and
empirical studies of opinion change in relation to deliberative democracy and citizens’
juries, respectively. The third section outlines the methodological aspects of our study,
leading into the fourth section which presents the findings. The fifth section discusses the
results in relation to what is already known and offers conclusions.
1.1. Deliberative Democracy and Opinion Change
Deliberative democrats believe opinions should be open to development during the
political process, through deliberation, rather than concluded prior to it. This implies that
interlocutors need to be willing to change their minds. Indeed, for Chambers [10] (p. 318)
‘a central tenet of all deliberative theory is that deliberation can change minds and transform
opinions’, while for Elster [11] (p. 6) ‘the transformation of preferences through rational
deliberation is the ostensible goal of arguing’. The normative argument is that through
engaging in public deliberation participants’ opinions do not just change, they become
more ‘informed, enlightened, and authentic’ [12] (p. 1) (see also [13]). Consequently,
opinion change is not necessarily desirable per se, as people might change their minds
due to ‘conscious manipulation’ or ‘unconscious bias’ [8] (p. 321). For example, empirical
research indicates that, when participating in collective discussion, people will change
their opinions due to ‘inequalities, biases, and manipulatory strategies’ [14] (p. 380), such
as the employment of particular frames [15]. Further, opinions may change to comply with
majorities to achieve conformity [16], or through being ‘undermined by group norms’ [17]
(p. 657), due to group polarization [18] and due to cognitive constraints [19], all of which are
problematic for deliberative theory [20]. Therefore, when people change their minds, if it is
to be authentic and legitimate, it must be due to the ‘mechanisms specified in the normative
theories’ of deliberative democracy [21] (p. 1). Ultimately, the distinction is between
manipulation, which is bad for deliberative democracy, and non-coercive persuasion,
which is good [22]. Here we focus on two of these mechanisms related to persuasion;
information gains and reasoning.
During collective deliberation, participants pool the relevant information they have
on the issue at hand, leading to information gains for most participants [23,24], which can,
in turn, lead to changes in opinion [25]. This is a significant benefit of collective deliberation,
but, for Rosenberg [26] (p. 109), what is more important, from a deliberative point of view,
is whether the increased information improves ‘the quality of their reasoning’. Therefore,
it is not just receiving more information that should induce opinion reflection and change,
but the process of public reasoning more broadly. For deliberative democrats, opinions,
preferences and attitudes are adaptable to reason and, through consideration of differing
reasons, existing opinions can be transformed and new opinions formed: ‘democratic
deliberation is publicly reasoned in the sense that people offer reasons in support of their
opinions and perspectives, hope they will prove convincing to others and expect these
reasons, and these reasons alone, to be the motivating force of people accepting them or
not’ [27] (p. 69). In sum, we need both information and reasons to form coherent opinions
between available options [25].
Deliberative democrats do accept, however, that participating in collective deliberation
will not always cause opinion change. On reviewing the new information and considering
the reasons others provide, a participant may decide that their initial opinions were still
appropriate and publicly defensible [23]. This is legitimate from a deliberative perspective,
providing participants entered the deliberative process with an open mind [13,23,28,29].
Therefore, a non-coercive reflection is required, rather than opinion change per se [13].
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Despite this acknowledgement, there are good reasons why we expect deliberation to
affect opinion [14]. Firstly, citizens often enter deliberation with tentative and incomplete
views [24,30]. This is especially the case if the opinions of those deliberating are unlikely to
be consequential. Rational choice theory implies that citizens would not have the motiva-
tion to become informed about an issue if their influence is likely to be very limited [31].
Secondly, participants in inclusive public deliberation should be exposed to different kinds
of information and arguments to what is usual for them [23,32,33], which encourages them
to see issues in a different light and may affect their views [25]. Thirdly, in the course of
devising and articulating public reasons to justify their position, participants may adapt
their opinions [29,34].
For others, public deliberation is not always required if it is accepted that uncoerced
opinion reflection is key [35], as ‘deliberation within’ can also generate public reasoning be-
cause other opinions can be made ‘imaginatively present’ through individuals conducting
‘a wide-ranging debate within their heads’ [36] (pp. 63–64). This involves an ‘internal reflec-
tive process’ amongst participants where they put themselves in the place of the other [37]
(p. 81). Indeed, we weigh up reasons and attempt to understand the reasons of others, all
through internal reflection, even when we do engage in collective deliberation [35], which
may occur between, not necessarily within, deliberations [38].
The problem is that, despite the importance of open-mindedness, opinion reflection
and opinion change for deliberative democracy, there are significant gaps in our under-
standing about the connection between these [14].
1.2. Citizens’ Juries and Opinion Change
Mini-publics are the most lauded device for institutionalising deliberative democ-
racy but have also been employed by researchers seeking to test the normative claims of
deliberative democracy [39], particularly those relating to opinion change [32,33]. They
are seen as an opportunity for citizens to deliberate on important and contentious issues,
and to reflect on and revise their opinions in light of deliberation. There are various types
of mini-public, including planning cells, consensus conferences, deliberative polls, and
citizens’ assemblies, but here we focus on citizens’ juries. Citizens’ juries are typically
organised into three sequential phases: an ‘information phase’ where witnesses provide a
range of evidence and advocacy of relevant information and positions as a supplement to
the sharing of information amongst jurors; a ‘deliberation phase’ where citizens discuss the
merits of different options and reach a collective decision; and a ‘reflection phase’ which
occurs in between. It is important to note that all three phases can be ‘reflective’ and that
the ‘information’ phase is discursive too, as it includes the questioning of the witnesses
and informal talk, but it can still be differentiated from the more formal deliberation phase
where jurors strive to reach a collective viewpoint on the issue at hand [35].
The significant focus that mini-publics have been afforded by deliberative democrats
‘is based on the premise that the norms of deliberative democracy are so difficult to achieve
in practice that it will not occur naturally, so the conditions . . . need to be artificially
created’ [40] (p. 7); [32]. For practical reasons, stratified random sampling is employed
to recruit a diverse selection of citizens, ensuring that each person has an equal chance
of being selected within their stratum. The aim is to assemble a ‘deliberative microcosm’
of the population that is ‘small enough to be genuinely deliberative and representative
enough to be genuinely democratic’ [41] (p. 11). Most studies of this nature are very small
in order to achieve these deliberative aims; e.g., Strandberg et al.’s use of two citizens’
forums with 17 and 18 people (21 citizens and 14 politicians) [42]; Baccaro et al.’s twelve
discussion groups of 9 to 11 students per group [20]; and the use of 57 discussion groups by
Gastil et al. [43], with only 3 to 6 students per group. However, given the small number of
participants (typically 12–25 [44]) in citizens’ juries, they are not intended to be statistically
representative of the population, but ‘demographically diverse’ [45] (p. 96). The hope
is that this will also lead to a diversity of starting positions on the issue, although the
likelihood of this is disputed [46]. Because the sampled citizens are probably not partisan
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stakeholders on the issue, they tend not to have strong pre-deliberative opinions on the
issue being discussed and are, therefore, more likely to enter the process with an open
mind, amenable to reflection and opinion change [4].
Opinion change does appear to be commonplace in citizens’ juries [44,47–51]. How-
ever, most of these studies are based on surveys of the jurors’ attitudes before and after the
process. Therefore, although they show that opinions do change, the results cannot fully
explain when and why the participants changed their minds. Adopting an experimental
design, Esterling et al. [52] randomised 2793 participants to small discussion tables in
19 Town Halls in the USA, with an average of about 8 people per table. By separating imme-
diate intuitions, measured through questions of latent ideology, and deliberate, analytical
thinking, based on topic-specific questions, namely System 1 versus System 2 thinking [53],
they were able to show that argument-based persuasion, rather than polarisation by ideol-
ogy, influenced participants’ opinions. It was most likely for opinions to change when the
discussions were perceived as well-informed, although no attempt was made to separate
the contributions of information and deliberation.
Strandberg and Berg [42] found that facilitated rather than non-facilitated deliberation
prevented opinion polarisation and may relate to aggregate-level change and the magnitude
of change at the individual level (see also [20,54]). Himmelroos and Christensen [55] also
found in their quasi-experimental study that deliberation moved people away from the
extremes, rather than any evidence of group dynamics changing opinions, although they
admit it might be due to information rather than deliberation per se. In contrast, Herne
et al. [56] find that increased knowledge can cause polarisation at the individual level;
it varies according to deliberative context, and deliberation in mini-publics can reduce
polarisation at the aggregate level.
The evidence on opinion change from mini-publics in general, and citizens’ juries
in particular, has been criticised, as it is hard to prove that opinion change has been the
result of the deliberative phase and not just the information provided, media coverage,
discussion procedures adopted, or other political or psychological factors [20,32,57–60].
Indeed, research on deliberative polls could not identify any ‘robust’ predictor of opinion
change [61]. In short, many of the existing studies on deliberation and opinion change fail
to uncover ‘the underlying opinion processes at work’ [23] (p. 688).
Research on the ‘Far North Queensland Citizens’ Jury’ in Australia attempted to find
a resolution to this shortcoming [35]. Twelve jurors were surveyed at the beginning and
end of the jury process, and once during the process between the information phase and
the deliberation phase of the jury. The before and after analysis indicated that the jurors’
opinions on the various policy options changed greatly, and ‘the bigger change, by a wide
margin, occurred in the minds of the jurors before the jury’s formal discussion began’ (i.e.,
before the deliberation phase), possibly in anticipation of forthcoming deliberations [35] (p.
634). Although the deliberation phase did produce opinion change, the changes within
the information phase were substantially greater than those in the deliberative phase [35].
The jurors themselves also reported feeling that most impacts on any changes to their
opinions occurred during the information phase (Ibid.). Goodin and Niemeyer [35] argue
that these findings are not due to the fact that the information phase occurred first and
lasted three times longer than the deliberation phase, because the opinion changes were not
random, continuous, unidirectional, or proportional to the duration of the information and
deliberation phases. Further, evidence from deliberative polls [62] supports the findings
that information, rather than discussion, has the greatest effect on the magnitude of opinion
change. The findings are also corroborated by the outcomes from citizens’ assemblies
in Canada that followed a discussion-information-discussion format and found that the
information session was the most influential on participant attitudes [63].
Goodin and Niemeyer [35] do not conclude that opinion change in citizens’ juries
can simply be explained by information gains. After all, discussion did occur during the
information phase, and the deliberative phase also led to opinion change. Furthermore,
some psychological studies indicate that increased information is not a reliable source of
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opinion change in itself [64], while Sanders [61] finds that in deliberative polls there is no
effect of knowledge gain on opinion change. Rather, Goodin and Niemeyer conclude that
internal-reflexive processes of ‘democratic deliberation within’ are of central importance to
the deliberative process, as it may alter ‘the way people process . . . information and hence
(perhaps) what they think about the issue’ [35] (p. 642). Furthermore, when receiving the
information in the initial phase, the jurors did so in anticipation of having to deliberate later
in the process, where they knew they would have to find a publicly defensible position
and account for their views with reasons [35]. Again, this is consistent with other studies
on deliberative polls, which indicate that knowledge gains of participants are enhanced by
deliberation [65,66] and that those who enter the process with the least knowledge change
their opinions to the greatest extent [67]. That said, research from a mini-public held in
Ireland in 2011 indicates that deliberation might still be crucial for opinion change [68] as it
has different effects on opinion than information [69]. A control group was provided with
the same information packs as the mini-public participants but did not go on to undertake
collective deliberation. The control group did not undergo as much opinion change as the
mini-public participants [68]. Clearly, further research is required to establish the cause(s)
of citizen opinion change in mini-publics.
As Curato et al. [70] argue, deliberative transformation takes time and may not follow
a linear path, with initial informational effects producing a cathartic change, which might
later develop into deliberative opinions after further reflection [35]. Citizens’ juries may be
too short to enable the tracking of these deeper transformations. Moreover, a significant
limitation of these studies is that they focussed on a one-off, isolated mini-public. Therefore,
we do not know if another sample of citizens would have adopted similar opinions after
the process and if the information phase would consistently prove to have the most
significant effect on opinions [23,71]. Citizens’ juries are potentially more affected by this
issue than other types of mini-public, since they do not comprise scientifically comparable
samples [24]. The question of how reliable mini-publics’ outcomes are is important, as
some scholars suggest that the opinions of mini-public participants should act as trusted
proxies to guide broader public opinion and policy-making [9]. Whether the opinions of
mini-public participants are consistently compatible with norms of deliberation should
be a crucial consideration on whether they should be trusted proxies. Consequently,
the study presented here considers if, how and when participants changed their views in
three citizens’ juries, in substantively different contextual frames, held contemporaneously
on the same issue. Such an approach has been hailed as essential: ‘If we want to find
out more about how deliberation can best be institutionalised, we need cases where
institutional characteristics form the independent variable and where other variables that
affect outcomes of interaction are as constant as possible’ [14] (p. 397). Goodin and
Niemeyer [35] issued one survey between the information and deliberation phase of their
jury, and so were unable to trace the influence of the reflection phase on an opinion that
occurs in-between. We issued four surveys to overcome this limitation. We turn now to a
full consideration of these cases and methods.
2. Materials and Methods
The research was designed as a natural experiment, whereby the project held three
standardised citizens’ juries in different locations in Scotland, selected according to their
exposure to windfarm developments at the time (Table 1). Essentially, one location (Cold-
stream) acted as the control group, since no windfarms existed or were planned, while
the others either had existing windfarms in the locality (Aberfeldy) or they were under
consideration (Helensburgh). The only other variation between the groups was the partici-
pants themselves, who were selected to reflect the socio-demographic diversity present
across Scotland and exhibiting varying attitudes to wind energy. There was no opportunity
to randomise individuals to the different localities in order to implement a pure experi-
ment. There was also an unavoidable change of two of the five witnesses who provided
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information in Coldstream. In all other respects, the conditions were kept as constant as
possible.










Day 1: 26 October 2013 15
1813
No existing or proposed




Day 1: 9 November 2013 14
14,626
Early stages of proposal;




Day 1: 18 January 2014 18
1895 Large operating windfarm;
within 10 kmDay 2: 1 February 2014 6 male, 12 female
The research project was overseen by a formal Stewarding Board, including advocates
and opponents of windfarms, and had two broad aims, to contribute to: (1) substantive un-
derstanding of public attitudes to onshore windfarm development, and (2) methodological
understanding of mini-publics and how they might be used. This paper focuses on aspects
of the latter aim. In order to develop analytical purchase on this second aim, we developed
two sets of hypotheses (H), based on previous research, that we wished to evaluate in
relation to the phase (H1 and H2) and context (H3 to H5) of the citizens’ juries, respectively.
These are presented schematically for ease of reference and overview, but they follow from
the insights gleaned from the earlier sections, with brief rationales provided after each one.
Hypothesis 1 (H1). Greater opinion change is expected in the information phase.
This is likely to be the result of witness argumentation, as well as general information
received on Day 1 [52].
Hypothesis 2 (H2). The facilitated deliberation phase is likely to reveal greater change at the
individual level rather than in aggregate opinions, through a more nuanced and open-minded
appreciation of opposing arguments.
While facilitated deliberation is expected to minimise enclave polarisation [42,72],
opinion crystallisation, rather than change, may occur where there is little diversity in
starting positions [73].
Hypothesis 3 (H3). Lack of local relevance of windfarms, either now or in the immediate future, is
likely to lead to a relatively neutral set of opinions.
This indicates that we would expect Coldstream to be relatively indifferent in their
attitudes compared to the other juries, since there are no local consequences [31].
Hypothesis 4 (H4). Unless there are perceived detrimental effects, familiarity with windfarms is
likely to lead to acceptance of the status quo, leading to:
Hypothesis 4a (H4a). The most positive attitudes.
Previous research has made this connection [74,75].
Hypothesis 4b (H4b). Smaller changes in opinions.
This would suggest that, in the absence of evidence of detriment, Aberfeldy is likely
to show the most positive attitudes to windfarms and the least change in their opinions
during the process compared to Coldstream or Helensburgh [76].
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Hypothesis 5 (H5). Anticipation of change without public involvement, when the outcome is
unfamiliar or unexpected, creates uncertainty, leading to resistance and negative opinions of that
change.
It would be expected that the greatest negative opinion would be seen in Helensburgh
(planned windfarm), where jurors did not raise the principle of public involvement, unlike
the other juries. Existing research has shown the importance of community participation
on acceptance, especially through information sharing [77], rather than NIMBYism [76].
Differences between localities are expected to occur irrespective of variations in group
composition relating to socio-demography [55] but may be affected by different starting
attitudes [73].
2.1. Sample
Each jury comprised between 14 and 18 participants (Table 1), selected to represent a
cross-section of Scottish citizens by gender, age, and income (Table 2). The group also repre-
sented a mixture of educational attainment, working status, involvement in civic activities,
such as volunteering or activism, and a range of attitudes towards the environment and
wind farms. The initial sample was 49 jurors, but two female participants (Coldstream and
Helensburgh) dropped out during the process due to ill health or relocation, leaving 47.
Table 2. Participant demography (aggregate of the three citizens’ juries) (n = 47).
Demographic Measure Target (%) Actual (%) Actual (n)
Gender
Male 50 49 23
Female 50 51 24
Age
18–24 20 19 9
25–54 50 53 25





Part time 9 4





Further education 21 10




under GBP 15,999 per year >40 34 14
GBP 16,000 GBP 31,199 >20 37 15
GBP 31,200 to GBP 51,999 >10 20 8
GBP 52,000 or above >5 10 4
Sustainability 2021, 13, 9852 9 of 21
Table 2. Cont.
Demographic Measure Target (%) Actual (%) Actual (n)
Civic activities
Have taken part in one or more activities
Mix
49 23
Have not taken part 51 24




Should be fewer 24 11
Current level about right 31 15





Neither interested nor uninterested 5 2
Not very/not at all interested 7 3
Participants were recruited face-to-face by a market research company according to
a pre-agreed specification. The jury topic remained unknown to the participants prior to
the event to minimise the self-selection of an already engaged minority, so the project was
vaguely described to prospective participants as ‘public conversations about environmental
issues’. A question in the recruitment process allowed the selection of participants with a
range of interests in wind energy, without revealing at this stage that the discussions were
going to focus on onshore windfarms. Recruiters were instructed to assure participants
that knowledge or interest in environmental issues did not affect eligibility. If the topic was
completely unknown, people may have been reticent to sign up.
Each jury was held over two full days (Saturdays), either 2 or 3 weeks apart, for which
jurors were compensated for their participation (GBP 70 for day 1; GBP 100 for day 2). The
process was designed and facilitated by two engagement practitioners, whose approach is
outlined in Escobar et al. [78]. At the start participants were presented with the overall task
for the citizens’ jury: “There are strong views on windfarms in Scotland, with some people being
strongly opposed, others being strongly in favour and a range of opinions in between. What should
be the key principles for deciding about windfarm development in Scotland, and why?”
2.2. Content of the Citizens’ Juries
There were three evidence sessions on Day 1:
I. Energy and Climate Change: One academic witness, who sought to present an
impartial overview.
II. Wind Energy: Two witnesses, one presenting the argument ‘for’ and the other
‘against’ wind power.
III. Windfarms: Two witnesses (different from those in session two), one presenting
the argument ‘for’ and the other ‘against’ onshore windfarms.
For each, the jury heard brief presentations from the witness(es) followed by a longer
session for scrutiny, where the jurors first worked in groups to prioritise key questions and
then interrogated the witnesses in plenary. The witnesses were drawn from universities (3),
NGOs (2), and trade bodies (2).
Should the jurors wish to learn more between the two days, each participant was
provided with a user-friendly Handbook (https://www.climatexchange.org.uk/media/14
42/citizens_juries_handbook.pdf (accessed on 26 August 2021)), which presented back-
ground information about climate change and energy, and links to resources for further
information in various formats. The Handbook was prepared by an independent group
under the oversight of the Stewarding Board. After Day 1, the witnesses were given a list
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of questions that were not addressed in the plenary, due to time constraints. Their written
answers were circulated to the jurors approximately a week before Day 2.
On Day 2, the jurors set the agenda by agreeing on key themes to structure the
deliberations, which eventually led to the group ‘verdict’; a series of prioritised statements
that expressed their principles for windfarm development and summed up the various
group opinions. The same process was adopted for all three juries with respect to the
structure, duration, topic, facilitators, and engagement with witnesses.
2.3. Data Construction
The project entailed a parallel mixed methods research design [79], comprising six data
sources, including questionnaires conducted individually at four time points and several
interviews and observations. This paper focuses largely on relevant results from the ques-
tionnaires, supplemented by observations of ethnographers and evaluators, to understand
if, how and when citizens’ opinions changed during the jury process.
Jurors were asked to complete a series of highly structured questionnaires throughout
the process, incorporating mainly closed response options. Several questions were repeated
throughout the process, enabling opinions to be tracked. The four questionnaires were
administered to record participants’ opinions and beliefs during the process as follows:
a. QA1, at the start of Day 1, as a baseline measure
b. QA2, at the end of Day 1, following the information phase (i.e., the formal evidence-
giving phase)
c. QA3, at the start of Day 2, following the reflection phase (i.e., following a 2 or 3 week
break between jury days)
d. QA4, at the end of Day 2, following the deliberation phase.
Therefore, we are able to assess the extent of opinion change in the reflection phase,
unlike in the Goodin and Niemeyer [35] study.
2.4. Data Analysis
Data from the four survey questionnaires are used in the following analyses. Three
scaled variables are created to reflect citizens’ underlying opinions on wind power and
energy policy, windfarms in the locality, and windfarm planning, respectively. Each scale
is an additive index based on the strength of agreement/disagreement with a series of
statements related to each of the three topics, for which scale reliability is calculated using
Cronbach’s alpha (Table 3). Each question was scored −2 (strongly disagree), −1(disagree),
0 (neither agree nor disagree), +1 (agree), +2 (strongly agree), based on level of agreement
with each statement. Missing values were replaced by the median response to the given
question in the survey wave for that jury location.
Table 3. Scaled variable question composition and reliability scores.
Scale CodingReversed (X)
1: Wind Power and Energy Policy
It is important for Scotland to develop its wind energy resources
I think Scotland should invest in other renewable electricity sources rather
than wind power X
Wind energy development is important for combatting climate change
Wind energy development is economically important for Scotland
For wind energy, the positives outweigh the negatives
Windfarm developments offer the prospect of future jobs in Scotland
Cronbach’s alpha: 0.9216
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Scale CodingReversed (X)
2: Windfarms in the Locality
I would like it if this area produced electricity from wind power
I would like it if this area produced electricity from wind power, if the
electricity was for local use
I would prefer to see electricity from wind power produced somewhere
other than this area X
Windfarm developments decrease the value (the price) of houses nearby X
The financial rewards from windfarms benefit the energy companies rather
than the local community X
Overall, communities located close to windfarms benefit from the
development
Windfarms would not change my relationship with the countryside
Cronbach’s alpha: 0.7842
3: Windfarm Planning
I support the development of onshore windfarms in appropriate locations
I support the development of windfarms offshore (at sea)
Windfarms pose greater threat to the local environment than climate change X
Windfarms are planned and designed to minimise the potential
environmental damage
Windfarms are planned and designed to minimise the potential disruption to
people living nearby
The rules about wind farm plans minimise the noise and visual appearance
of wind farms
Windfarms are harmful to the health of people living nearby X
Cronbach’s alpha: 0.8663
Comparisons are made between jurors’ opinions following each phase of the delibera-
tive process using two different approaches. The first treats each jury as a separate sample
to compare average opinion changes within juries, to provide contextual comparisons over
the jury process. We use paired sample t-tests and Wilcoxon sign-tests to compare changes
in the mean and median values, respectively. The second combines the three juries into one
general sample (due to the similar structure and timing across all juries), to increase the
statistical power in our analyses in understanding if, how, and when changes take place
overall. A four-wave Generalised Least Squares (GLS) model with random effects [80] was
used to investigate the relationship between each jury phase and individuals’ opinions on
each of the three scales, with standard errors clustered by location. All statistical analysis
was conducted using Stata, v14.2.
3. Results
For all three scales (Table 4), the starting opinions (QA1) were most positive in Aber-
feldy, the locality with a windfarm, and least positive in Helensburgh, where a windfarm
was being considered. We discuss statistically significant changes in each scale for each
phase in turn, though a similar pattern is observed across all three scales.
At the beginning of Day 1, individuals held a positive opinion of wind power and
energy policy, particularly in Aberfeldy and Coldstream, while Helensburgh bordered
on neutral. However, opinions in Coldstream declined notably during the information
phase, with no significant change thereafter, ending fairly neutral. In Aberfeldy, a small
(not statistically significant) opinion decline occurred during the first day (information
phase) and between the first and the second day (reflection phase), but with no noticeable
effect during the deliberation phase, still concluding positively. Helensburgh, however,
revealed a significant decline, particularly during the information phase (which shows the
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most dramatic opinion shift observed in all scales), but also the deliberation phase, leaving
them ultimately much more negative than the other juries in absolute terms.
Table 4. Jurors’ opinion changes over two days for three scaled variables.





1. Wind Power and Energy Policy (−12 most negative; 0 neutral; 12 most positive)
All jurors (n = 47)
QA1 2.64 4 5.89 −12 11
QA2 −0.47 1 6.46 −12 9 −3.11 *** −3.00 ***
QA3 −0.49 1 6.81 −12 11 −0.02 0
QA4 −1.30 0 7.02 −12 10 −0.81 * −1
Coldstream (n = 15)
QA1 2.73 4 5.75 −10 10
QA2 0.80 1 5.19 −12 9 −1.93 *** −3.00 ***
QA3 1.87 2 6.22 −12 10 1.07 1
QA4 0.87 1 4.75 −12 9 −1 −1
Helensburgh (n = 14)
QA1 0.43 −1 7.52 −12 11
QA2 −6.57 −7 4.15 −12 2 −7.00 *** −6.00 **
QA3 −6.36 −7 5.79 −12 11 0.21 0
QA4 −8.21 −11 5.55 −12 8 −1.85 ** −4
Aberfeldy (n = 18)
QA1 4.28 4 4.06 −7 11
QA2 3.22 4 5.59 −12 9 −1.06 0
QA3 2.11 3 5.26 −9 9 −1.11 * −1
QA4 2.28 4 5.86 −11 10 0.17 1
2. Windfarms in the locality (−14 most negative; 0 neutral; 14 most positive)
All jurors (n = 47)
QA1 0.17 1 5.55 −13 9
QA2 −2.19 −1 5.05 −10 8 −2.36 *** −2.00 ***
QA3 −2.00 −1 5.31 −11 9 0.19 0
QA4 −2.53 −2 5.16 −14 8 −0.53 −1
Coldstream (n = 15)
QA1 0.07 1 4.53 −13 6
QA2 −0.33 1 3.85 −10 7 −0.4 0
QA3 0.20 0 3.47 −7 6 0.53 −1
QA4 −0.67 0 4.78 −14 7 −0.87 0
Helensburgh (n = 14)
QA1 −1.29 −2 5.84 −13 6
QA2 −6.93 −7 2.81 −10 −1 −5.64 *** −5.00 **
QA3 −6.93 −7 3.52 −10 2 0 0
QA4 −5.93 −7 4.46 −11 3 1 0
Aberfeldy (n = 18)
QA1 1.39 3 6.08 −12 9
QA2 −0.06 0 4.93 −10 8 −1.45 −3
QA3 0.00 −1 5.32 −11 9 0.06 −1
QA4 −1.44 −2 4.93 −10 8 −1.44 * −1
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3. Windfarm Planning (−14 most negative; 0 neutral; 14 most positive)
All jurors (n = 47)
QA1 3.85 6 6.26 −14 14
QA2 1.62 2 6.51 −14 14 −2.23 *** −4.00 ***
QA3 1.40 2 6.84 −12 14 −0.22 0.00 *
QA4 0.91 3 7.12 −14 14 −0.49 1
Coldstream (n = 15)
QA1 4.40 6 6.34 −14 10
QA2 2.73 4 4.35 −5 10 −1.67 −2.00 *
QA3 3.80 5 5.20 −6 14 1.07 1
QA4 2.87 3 5.82 −8 14 −0.93 −2
Helensburgh (n = 14)
QA1 1.36 1 6.86 −13 14
QA2 −3.50 −6 6.35 −14 10 −4.86 *** −7.00 *
QA3 −5.36 −6 5.11 −12 6 −1.86 ** 0.00 **
QA4 −5.71 −7 6.06 −14 5 −0.35 −1
Aberfeldy (n = 18)
QA1 5.33 6 5.41 −11 14
QA2 4.67 4 5.99 −11 14 −0.66 −2
QA3 4.67 5 5.50 −7 13 0 1
QA4 4.44 5 5.35 −10 13 −0.23 0
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. Key: QA1: Start of Day 1, QA2: End of Day 1, QA3: Start of Day 2, QA4: End of Day 2.
Regarding the second scale, windfarms in the locality, jurors in Aberfeldy (located
close to a large windfarm) showed the most positive opinions at the start but became more
negative during deliberation, ending more negative than jurors in Coldstream (where there
were no windfarms proposed at the time), which had remained relatively neutral through-
out. Helensburgh, where at the time of the study a prospective windfarm development
was being proposed, started negatively and then declined further during the information
phase.
The third scale, concerning windfarm planning, showed strongly positive support in
Coldstream and Aberfeldy at the beginning, with a more neutral stance in Helensburgh.
Once again, from a moderately positive position at the start, a statistically significant
decline was seen in Helensburgh during the information and reflection phases, while a
relatively small decline was seen in Coldstream during the information phase. Opinions in
Aberfeldy remained high throughout the phases.
If we treat the three juries as one sample, we consistently see statistically significant
declines in opinion in all scales following the information phase, in both the means and
the medians, influenced by the strong effect in Helensburgh. Smaller declines are evident
in different localities during the reflection and deliberation phases. In general, there was
a high level of stability in the period between the two jury days. Nonetheless, there was
a fair degree of opinion diversity at the individual level at each stage, as shown by the
relatively large standard deviations.
The results above indicate that jurors do exhibit changes in opinion during the process
and, moreover, these occur in different phases and on different topics to different degrees
in the three jury locations. The random-effects GLS regression model in Table 5, with
standard errors clustered by location, looks at the level of opinion at each phase of the
process relative to the start for all jurors (n = 47). While the models were run with the
inclusion of socio-demographic traits, including age, gender, and education level, none of
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these attributes were found to be statistically meaningful in explaining levels of opinion
and were therefore omitted here to create a more parsimonious model.
Table 5. Regression model coefficients for opinion changes by phase for each scale.
Wind Power and Energy Policy Windfarms in Locality Windfarm Planning
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
(s.e.) p-Value (s.e.) p-Value (s.e.) p-Value
Constant
(QA1) 2.638 0.019 0.170 0.829 3.851 0.001
(1.124) (0.788) (1.174)
QA2 −3.106 0.083 −2.362 0.115 −2.234 0.071
(1.790) (1.497) (1.237)
QA3 −3.128 0.062 −2.170 0.178 −2.447 0.203
(1.677) (1.610) (1.924)
QA4 −3.936 0.064 −2.809 0.015 −2.936 0.119
(2.121) (1.156) (1.886)
n 188 188 188
R2 0.0511 0.0418 0.0282
Table 5 reveals the varied mean starting opinion levels for each scale, with ‘wind
power and energy policy’, and ‘windfarm planning’ initially positive, while ‘windfarm
locality’ showed a relatively neutral view. Following the information phase on Day 1, the
initially positive scales exhibited negative opinion shifts that were marginally statistically
significant. During the period between the jury days, when participants could reflect on
the first day, opinions hardly changed.
After the second day, when participants had the opportunity to deliberate on the
topic, views on the scales ‘wind power and energy policy’, and ‘windfarm locality’ are
statistically more negative than the start of the process, unlike ‘windfarm planning’, despite
all three scale coefficients indicating lower mean opinion levels. The inability to obtain
statistically significant findings could be an artefact of small sample sizes, reflecting the
nature of the project.
4. Discussion
We find that during a citizens’ jury, the information phase most influences jurors’
opinions, rather than the reflection and deliberation phases. This is in agreement with
other studies [35,62,63], and supports our first hypothesis (H1).
Across all three scales, we repeatedly observe statistically meaningful changes across
the information phase. Given the likelihood of being more informed in Aberfeldy, due to
the existence of a windfarm locally, jurors show less change than in the other localities in
relation to wind power/energy policy and windfarm planning, although not windfarms in
the locality.
There is evidence of a smaller change in aggregate opinions in the deliberative phase,
compared to the information phase, but higher variation in individual opinions within
each phase as measured by the standard deviation. Jurors reported higher self-assessed
and retained knowledge after Day 2, despite little formal information exchange in the
deliberation phase, indicating support for the second hypothesis (H2).
Most jurors considered climate change to be an important issue, although some
Coldstream and Aberfeldy participants did not hold this view. However, the Helensburgh
jury was less in favour of renewables, initially arguing for natural gas (fossil fuel) in their
top five energy sources, later replaced by nuclear energy. Given the relatively negative
opinion throughout the process on all three scales in Helensburgh, a jury that commented
on its relative unanimity of attitudes, it does suggest that there has been a crystallisation
of opinions by the conclusion. The relatively large standard deviation in the deliberation
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phase, coupled with relatively less aggregate change, does show support for the second
hypothesis.
The relatively neutral or middle position throughout the process found in Coldstream,
where no windfarms existed or were planned, indicates strong support for the third
hypothesis (H3) across all scales. It is interesting that, while these jurors’ attitudes became
more negative during the information phase in relation to wind power/energy policy and
windfarm planning, there was little statistical change subsequently on any scale. Their
views are more likely to be hypothetical than Aberfeldy, which may be particularly apposite
concerning local impact, given that their attitudes may be inconsequential.
There is clear evidence for Aberfeldy having the most positive opinions throughout
the process compared to the other localities, thus supporting hypothesis H4a, except after
deliberation about windfarms in the locality. This jury does show the least change in
opinions in relation to windfarm planning, but about the same as Coldstream in ‘wind
power and energy policy’ and more than Coldstream in relation to ‘windfarms in the
locality’. We have already noted that there may have been some local experiential concerns
about developments in Aberfeldy, which had a particular impact on this scale. It is worthy
of note that this locality is the only one not to have had statistically significant changes in
opinion after the information phase. Thus, we find partial support for the second part of
the fourth hypothesis (H4b), conditioned by non-hypothetical considerations.
There is very clear evidence in support of the fifth hypothesis (H5). The unfamiliarity
or unexpected change in the local area may be the likely cause of Helensburgh’s jury
exhibiting the most negative opinions on all three scales, both in relative and absolute
measure across the process. Although there was some imbalance in the gender composition
of this jury, it did not appear to show a consistent pattern. However, the imbalance of
views in this jury, unlike the others, with a clear dominance of a more negative view of
wind power before the start of the process is likely to explain the ensuing results. Only one
juror revealed a constantly positive position across the scales.
At first sight, our results may appear rather odd, given that deliberative theory
argues that opinion transformation is a result of collective discussion, argument, and
public reasoning, rather than simply more information [10–13,29]. However, as discussed
earlier, Goodin [36,37] and Goodin and Niemeyer [35] emphasise that it is not necessarily
deliberation, per se, that causes opinion reflection and opinion change, but a combination
of a focus of attention on the issue, the acquisition of information about it, and a process of
internal reflection, possibly induced by having to deliberate the issues later in the process
and the need to find a publicly defensible position. In other words, the prospect of having
to engage in group deliberation, justifying one’s opinions, and articulating a public position,
provides a strong incentive for jurors to take in and reflect on the evidence shared during
the information phase. Goodin and Niemeyer [35] believe that the pre-discursive phase
will invariably have greater salience than the deliberation phase, by changing the way that
jurors relate to an issue.
We think there is great value in the replication of the Goodin and Niemeyer findings
to both the internal and external validity of their project and ours [81]. This is especially
the case as, methodologically, we move beyond their study [82] to look at consistency in
opinion change in several standardised citizens’ juries and introduced an additional survey
instrument to enable us to account for the reflection period. This enabled us to consider
other contextual factors that might have a bearing on opinion change in citizens’ juries.
In order to understand the factors that influence participants’ opinions and how they might
change, we have considered such factors as the change in knowledge throughout the jury
process, proximity to windfarms (as measured by the different jury locations), the strength
of initial opinion on the topic, and socio–demographic characteristics. It is possible that
the witnesses, representing organisations with presumed authority, had an inordinate
effect on some jurors, especially if their own knowledge on the issue was limited. This
was the second most important reason for opinion change in the Goodin and Niemeyer
study [35]. Our analytical models explored the effects of socio-demographic variables
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(i.e., age, gender, and education), but we find very little correlation with the opinion
changes observed. As with Goodin and Niemeyer [35], we also conclude that our results
are not epiphenomenal. Although the information phase was the first phase in each of
the three juries we analysed, we look to evidence from deliberative polls which follow
a discussion-information-discussion format, but still found the information phase most
crucial. In addition, unlike the citizens’ jury that Goodin and Niemeyer [35] considered,
in the three Scottish citizens’ juries the information and deliberation phases each had the
same duration.
Most participants in each jury began the process slightly in favour of the current
energy policy and windfarm development in Scotland. However, it seems that exposure
to the complexity of the arguments during the information phase, which were sometimes
presented as a political debate, led to a more considered, nuanced, and sometimes sceptical
response. For example, the development principles generated by the juries feature support
to strengthen community benefits, local economic impact, and even public ownership as a
corrective to current profit-making by private landowners and developers of wind farms.
We also found from the ethnographer and observer fieldnotes, and survey questionnaire
open questions, that witnesses can have a significant influence on the intra-process opinions
of the citizen sample, whilst noting that the unavoidable change of two of them did not
impact greatly on the changes across the juries. For the overwhelming majority of jurors,
this was the first time they had been exposed to a task involving collective working with
fellow citizens on policy issues. While the explicit reason for their involvement was to
require them to deliberate on complex issues to arrive at a consensus on a set of principles,
the incentive in the information phase was to listen, consider and weigh the evidence and
values presented to them. Participants could reflect individually, or in groups, either while
agreeing on questions to ask the witnesses, or via informal conversations in the interstices
of the day; e.g., during tea/coffee breaks, over lunch, or in snatched asides to each other.
In other words, learning as an activity is not a passive act, but is a response to various
stimuli, both formal (information packs, witnesses) and informal (between jurors), that
incorporates discursive and reflective processes. While the deliberative phase makes public
the thoughts and discussions of jurors, it is erroneous to assume that the preceding phases
are not incorporated as part of a cumulative and developmental process.
In QA4, although jurors reflected that they felt that they learnt the most about the
topic on Day 1, the vast majority (88%) sought additional information from the Handbook,
the witnesses’ feedback, friends and family, and the internet during the reflection phase.
They also reported that the conversations in facilitated groups on Day 2 were useful for
helping them to make up their mind. This was apparent in the statistically significant
changes observed in the deliberation phase.
Nevertheless, it is clear that location is also an important factor in the findings about
opinion change, with Helensburgh providing the starkest example of a negative change in
opinions. Although jurors held similar views about renewable energy policy in all three
localities, the opinions about wind energy, windfarms, and climate change were on average
least supportive in the Helensburgh group from the start. The Helensburgh jury was not as
diverse as the other juries. Women were under-represented (Table 1), and the recruitment
company investigated these issues and found that the participants who did not attend were
mostly those who expressed moderate support for wind energy in the hidden recruitment
question. Thus, the jury had fewer advocates to express these perspectives during the
group conversations. Deliberations were less rich and diverse in the individual sessions,
and, at the end of Day 2, several jurors reflected how group discussions and agreements
backed up their opinions. The one Helensburgh juror in favour of windfarms reported
feeling like ‘the only one’ throughout the process.
Previous research on deliberation and opinion change has demonstrated the risk
of ‘enclave deliberation’ as it can lead to opinion polarization [18,83], although it might
be more a case of crystallisation [73]. The lack of diversity in the initial opinions of the
Helensburgh jurors led to the creation of such an enclave. However, we did not see
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opinions becoming unilaterally more extreme and polarised through the jury process;
even in Helensburgh, despite considerable polarisation, opinions were fluid, with some
participants becoming more supportive and others more opposed. This illustrates that
jurors were engaging with both sides of the argument, rather than simply assimilating
more information to back up views that they already held (confirmation bias). In short,
opinion reflection was stimulated in all three juries. Nevertheless, this still demonstrates
the importance of having a diversity of opinions in a mini-public beyond the witnesses
and the particular challenges citizens’ juries face here due to their small sample size.
It is difficult to be absolutely sure whether the possibility of a windfarm in the He-
lensburgh area influenced the jurors’ attitudes, although the results are in line with the
hypotheses. We do know that the plan had been controversial, especially given the rejection
of another windfarm development nearby. However, it transpired that many jurors were
unaware of the failed or future proposals, which might have raised their concerns in itself.
Those jurors who lived in the other localities were either used to windfarms (Aberfeldy) or
were likely to be aware of several moderate scale windfarms in their region (the Scottish
Borders), even if not in their patch (Coldstream). Another factor that might have been
important in the case of Helensburgh was the nearby location of a nuclear submarine base,
a significant employer in the area. Unlike the other two localities, several of these jurors
repeatedly suggested that nuclear power was a higher priority for energy production, a
position also taken by one of the witnesses, which may explain the very negative mean
for wind power in conclusion. This is in line with research that indicates that the local
social, economic, political, and historical context of any particular place will shape attitudes
towards any new development [84–86].
5. Conclusions
The strength of this study is in having three standardised juries in contexts that reflect
different levels of development relating to the topic under discussion, yet dealing with the
same questions, embedded within a longitudinal, and mixed methods design, resulting in
rich data for analysing opinion change between each phase and in aggregate.
Our findings confirm the importance of the information phase in changing jurors’
opinions, rather than the theoretically expected deliberative phase, or even the interme-
diary reflection phase. The provision of information causes a significant change in jurors’
opinions, probably due to being relatively uninformed at the start, which is less pronounced
in the rest of the deliberative process. Nevertheless, we believe the information phase
had such an influence on opinions in part because the jurors knew they were going to
collectively deliberate on these issues, which provided the incentive to gain information in
order to develop and justify their positions. We tentatively conclude that our labelling of
the phases, whilst ostensibly reflecting their purposes, actually may misrepresent what is
occurring in the process. In a nutshell, there is deliberation in the information phase, and
there is information in the deliberative phase. Therefore, we must be careful when ascribing
too much influence to any single phase and focus more on understanding the cumulative
and iterative effects of the mini-public process. Deliberative practice encompasses both
learning and discussion interwoven throughout, albeit with activities that may encourage
more of one or the other at different stages.
We conjecture that the information phase in these juries, through making the issues
appear to be much more complex than first appreciated and, therefore, offering less clear
solutions, led to jurors moderating their initial opinions and developing more nuanced and
negative arguments. Reasoning may in fact take place in private or informally during the
information phase, when these new challenges are made clear, rather than being delayed
until the deliberation phase, when issues related to the psychological aspects of advocating
and defending positions in public, such as confidence or saving face, become problematic.
This might have been catalysed by the perceived requirement to become briefed prior to
the deliberative phase.
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Importantly, we found that the information phase had the greatest influence on jury
opinions in those localities without a windfarm, albeit unequally. This suggests that when
different jurors discuss the same issue, under similar conditions, it is similar factors that de-
termine the final opinions. This is important to supporting claims that mini-publics could be
used to guide public opinion and policymaking, as it demonstrates that participants change
their views for reasons desirable from a deliberative perspective, namely because they are
more informed on the issue and because they need to develop an opinion on the issue that
could be defended publicly. However, substantively different contextual frames can lead
to inconsistent outcomes and how these factors can impact the outcomes of a citizens’ jury.
These findings are therefore important for our understanding of deliberative democracy
and the institutionalisation of mini-publics. They demonstrate that citizens’ juries should
be opinion diverse, to avoid enclave deliberation and polarisation/crystallisation of views,
and, if they are to be used for national policymaking, ideally they would include a mixture
of different contexts to understand their impact.
Our comparative case study research adds further exemplars of the importance of
pre-discursive work on opinion change and how particular features that maximize the
contextual differences, in this case, the level of development of on-shore windfarms, while
holding others constant (socio–demography, information, and witnesses), reveal how mini-
publics, such as citizens’ juries, can affect outcomes. Albeit these findings were derived
from an academic research project, they will be important knowledge for the use of citizens’
juries in an official policy process. As Flyvbjerg asserts [87], the richness of detail provided
by case studies, however small in themselves, can contribute multiple exemplars to the
cumulative development of generalised knowledge in a way that large samples may not.
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